An illuminated Book of Mormon symbolizes the overlooked depth of Latter-day Saint beliefs.

The Case for Taking Mormon Theology Seriously—Even If You Don’t Believe It

Stephen Webb’s Mormon Christianity

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Serious consideration of the analyses, arguments, and implications drawn from Stephen Webb’s book, Mormon Christianity:  What Other Christians Can Learn from The Latter-Day Saints, published by Oxford University Press in 2013, must acknowledge the influence of the “Mormon Moment,” brought about by the presidential candidacy of Mitt Romney in the election of 2012.  Without that historical context, the book is less likely to have been written and might well have been merely a chapter in a larger edited book on contemporary religions in America.  Not only did the Romney presidential candidacy put the LDS Church in the spotlight, but it also provoked—or at least gave reason for—spirited analyses and assessments of LDS doctrine and practice by Protestant and Catholic clerics and theologians.  

It is in the context of this commentary that Webb’s book stands out.  For a number of important reasons, this book offers a perspective on the Church and its doctrines that, insofar as I know, is available nowhere else in the form and context Webb provides.  One aspect of Webb’s analysis is what it offers to the larger Christian world who might not ever have had occasion to examine the Church so closely.  However, more important—at least in my mind—than what the book offers to scholars and non-members of the Church are the insights and analyses Webb offers to LDS Church members themselves.  He opens a door to understanding and provides a context for understanding the Church and its doctrines, which many LDS members and scholars may not have ever realized by themselves.

Webb describes his own religious background as part of the same restorationist tradition that informed much of the protestant world and contributed to the zeal of the protestant sects during the time of the “second great awakening” in the early part of the 19th century during the time of what we proclaim to be the restoration of the primitive and original Church of Jesus Christ.  That early restorationist movement also produced many of the prominent early members of the restored church.  Webb marks differences between the LDS Church and other restorationist movements.  While most restorationist movements expected that it would be necessary to essentially start over and reject all established sects in order to establish the true church, Webb notes that Joseph Smith took a different tack—which has been reiterated many times during the history of the restored Church.  

It was, essentially, to not reject out of hand all contemporary Christian doctrines deemed to have deviated from primitive Christianity.  Rather, Joseph Smith and the church he founded sought to examine doctrines and practices and, with the help of revelation, decide what could be maintained, what needed to be rejected, and how things might need to be modified and re-understood. Some of these considerations were made during the period in which they were translating and reading the Book of Mormon.  There is a sense of moderation here that is seldom recognized by outside observers and, especially, critics of the LDS Church. To such critics, certain key doctrines are sufficient to establish the church as deviant, and perhaps irretrievably so.  This perspective that Webb articulates is one that we might well examine in our own expressions of our doctrine and practices as we seek to both define ourselves and locate ourselves among other faith traditions.

Webb provides a list of what we might refer to as defining distinctions of the LDS version of restorationism, which, to some degree, provides a principal theme or thesis for the book.  We can think of these, perhaps, as a set (probably not the set) of defining principles of the restored gospel and the Church.  These principles are: 1) that all mortals can actually share, or come to share, in God’s own powers, 2) that spirits are composed of matter, and thus that God Himself has a material being, 3) that there are legitimate new (we might prefer to call them continuing) revelations from God to mortal beings and to the Church, and 4) that spirit or intelligence—which constitutes our identity—is pre-existent, i.e., that it did not (we did not) come into existence suddenly in an act of creation.  We should note here that these things seem so obvious and natural to us (as LDS members) that we sometimes lose sight of just how radically different they are in the context of contemporary Christian theology and practice.  Webb rightly notes that much of what makes us controversial, for better or for worse, centers on these four issues.(1)

It is in dealing with these issues where, in my view, Webb makes his most important contribution to our understanding of ourselves as Latter-day Saint Christians. In so doing, he makes available to us an insight that represents perhaps the most important contribution we can make, not only to the religious world but to the academic world and to the scholarly discourse of our time.  Webb’s contribution is simply this: he understands (even if we do not) that the unique aspects of our doctrine (a.k.a. our revealed religion) dealing with materiality, eternal uncreated intelligence, and the possibility of genuine perfectibility and godliness as we understand them and deal with them are genuinely metaphysical (or ontological) issues, and not just theological positions.  That our passive God is a metaphysical reality rather than merely a theological necessity is fundamental to our faith and, in combination with our claim of the perfectibility of immortal material souls, defines for us a unique place in the Christian world that cannot be easily ignored and overlooked.  Furthermore, although Webb does not develop this idea, these metaphysical—not merely theological—issues empower us to make a unique contribution to the scholarly discourse related to the human moral world, what it means to be a human being, and what constitutes a good and flourishing life.  And this contribution, because it is grounded in metaphysical rather than theological discourse, has untapped potential for good.

Stephen Webb was a very bright, careful thinker, a unique scholar, a deeply Christian man, a humble disciple, a good friend, and, in some ways, a Latter-day Saint.(2)  I think he will derive some joy if his gift to us of this book enables our mission and contributes to the restoration. I am honored that I could count him among my friends.

References: 

(1) It should be noted that Webb also takes up some of the more traditional controversies that the Church and its members often face. He has a chapter on Brigham Young and Parley P. Pratt as examples of LDS leaders and practices outside the traditional Christian mainstream. However, his treatment of these issues is fairly restrained.

(2)  See, for example, Webb’s article in First Things, February, 2012.

About the author

Richard Williams

Richard N. Williams is currently in the Department of Psychology at Brigham Young University, and former director of the Wheatley Institute. He has edited or co-authored several books, including most recently "On Hijacking Science" which he co-edited with Ed Gantt. He has a Ph.D. from Purdue University.
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